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The 2012 Amendments to Singapore’s 
Evidence Act: More Questions than 
Answers as Regards Expert Opinion 
Evidence?
ChEn SiyuAn*
AbstrAct
Singapore amended the expert opinion evidence provisions in its Evidence 
Act (EA) in 2012. The criteria for admissibility have been broadened, but the 
courts are now also expressly given the discretion to exclude relevant expert 
opinion evidence if it is ‘in the interests of justice’. This article explains why 
the 2012 amendments have raised more questions than answered them. First, 
Parliament did not appear to have properly appreciated the distinction—as 
conceptualised by the EA—between legal and logical relevance and relevance 
and admissibility. Second, it did not appear to have appreciated the distinction 
between general and specific relevance. Third, the introduction of the judicial 
discretion is a concept that neither comports with the common law position 
nor coheres with the EA. Fourth, whether there should have been continued 
applicability of the ‘ultimate issue rule’ could have been clarified. At bottom, 
Parliament did not demonstrate a keen understanding of the conceptualisa-
tion, structure, and principles of the antiquated EA. A framework for deter-
mining relevance and admissibility of evidence that is in accordance with the 
EA is thus proposed. As a number of Commonwealth jurisdictions share simi-
lar legislation to the EA, this article may be of interest to such jurisdictions as 
well.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Singapore Management university, Singapore.
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1. Introduction
(A) Establishing the Context: A Rare Set of Reforms to the 
Antiquated Evidence Act
Singapore’s Evidence Act (EA),1 which ‘was almost entirely modelled on the 
indian Evidence Act of 1872’,2 underwent significant amendments in 2012.3 
notably, this was only the third such exercise since the statute’s original enact-
ment in 1893.4 The 2012 amendments brought about five main (and rather dis-
tinct) changes, but in the interests of focus i will only be discussing in this article 
the changes made to the rules on expert opinion evidence.5 While these changes 
appear to have been well received by the legal community,6 it is submitted that 
they may have raised more questions than answered them, and this article seeks 
to highlight some of the potential problems that the Singapore courts (or less 
likely, legislature) ought to resolve in due course.
Before proceeding further, it should be noted that the 2012 amendments were 
spearheaded by the Ministry of Law, which had conducted a visibly public con-
sultation exercise in the lead-up to the draft amendments.7 Specifically for expert 
opinion evidence, the Ministry had also received input from a fairly comprehen-
sive report prepared by a Law Reform Committee (LRC Report). The LRC Report 
was commissioned by the Singapore Academy of Law and chaired by Vinodh 
Coomaraswamy SC (who has since been elevated to the high Court Bench as 
a Judicial Commissioner).8 it may therefore come as a surprise that despite the 
wide array of input (which is not always a given for Singapore law reform proj-
ects),9 the 2012 amendments have (as is submitted anyway) missed the mark, 
particularly with respect to expert opinion evidence.
1 Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed) (Singapore).
2 SC Jeffrey Pinsler, Evidence and the Litigation Process (Lexisnexis, 2010), 18.
3 Act 4 of 2012—Evidence (Amendment) Act 2012 (Singapore).
4 Evidence and the Litigation Process (n 2), 18–20.
5 The other four main changes involved extending legal professional privilege to in-house legal counsel; 
aligning the rules for admission of computer output evidence with those governing other forms of evi-
dence; broadening the categories of admissible hearsay evidence for both civil and criminal proceedings 
(including computer output evidence); and removing a provision that permitted the credit of a rape vic-
tim to be impeached by proof of immoral character: Ministry of Law, Proposed Amendments to the Evidence 
Act. http://app2.mlaw.gov.sg/news/tabid/204/Default.aspx?itemid=604 (accessed 2 February 2013).
6 The amendments were largely met with approval in Parliament (many of its members being prac-
ticing lawyers): Singapore Parliamentary Debates Official Report, 14 February 2012, vol 88. See also 
Opening Address of the honourable the Chief Justice at the Litigation Conference 2013, [27]–[28].
7 Ministry of Law, Public Consultation on Proposed Amendments to the Evidence Act. http://app2.mlaw.
gov.sg/news/tabid/204/Default.aspx?itemid=579 (accessed 2 February 2013).
8 Vinodh Coomaraswamy SC, Report of the Law Reform Committee on Opinion Evidence (October 2011). 
http://www.sal.org.sg/digitallibrary/Lists/Law%20Reform%20Reports/Attachments/34/01%20
LRC%20on%20Opinion%20Evidence%20%28FinAL%29.pdf (accessed 2 February 2013).
9 it has to be said, however, that there was also a wide-ranging consultative process that preceded the 
recent enactment of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) (Singapore), which had sig-
nificantly changed many of the previous rules on and assumptions underlying our law on criminal 
procedure: Melanie Chng ‘Modernising the Criminal Justice Framework’ [2011] Singapore Academy 
of Law Journal 23, 33.
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The 2012 Amendments to Singapore’s Evidence Act
But why was there a perceived need for reforming the law on expert opinion 
evidence in the first place?
(B) Comparing the Old and New Provisions Governing Expert 
Opinion Evidence
The Ministry of Law had helpfully summarised the rationale and limitations of 
the EA’s previous treatment of expert opinion evidence in the following terms:
in Singapore, the admission of expert opinion is regulated by section 47 of 
the EA. Generally, the rationale for regulating and controlling the admission 
and use of expert opinion is to minimise the inherent danger that tribunals 
of fact … will place undue emphasis on expert opinions and abdicate their 
ultimate responsibility to draw their own conclusions on all the relevant 
facts … there is also immense value in receiving objective, unbiased and 
reliable expert evidence on scientific and technical issues not within the 
common understanding of the trier of fact … the anachronistic wording of 
section 47 admits only opinions on five areas of specialised knowledge … it 
may be asked if such a strict restriction on the admission of expert opinion 
is necessary, given especially that in Singapore there is no need to protect a 
jury from powerful and confusing expert opinions; professional judges are 
capable of comprehending the subtleties of expert evidence and according 
the proper weight to such evidence.10
At this juncture, it may be helpful to compare what section 47 of the EA looked 
like before and after the 2012 amendments. This is what section 47 of the EA 
looked like before the amendments:
47.—(1) When the court has to form an opinion upon a point of foreign 
law or of science or art, or as to the identity or genuineness of handwriting 
or finger impressions, the opinions upon that point of persons specially 
skilled in such foreign law, science or art, or in questions as to the identity 
or genuineness of handwriting or finger impressions, are relevant facts.
(2) Such persons are called experts.
And this is what section 47 looks like after the amendments:11
47.—(1) Subject to subsection (4), when the court is likely to derive assis-
tance from an opinion upon a point of scientific, technical or other special-
ised knowledge, the opinions of experts upon that point are relevant facts.
10 Ministry of Law, Consultation Amendments to the Evidence Act. http://app2.mlaw.gov.sg/LinkClick.
aspx?fileticket=W7niXkDfPC8%3d&tabid=204 (accessed 2 February 2013) [8]–[9]. See also Evidence 
and the Litigation Process (n 2), 277–91.
11 it should be noted that the other EA provisions that pertain to opinion evidence (sections 48–53), 
most of which have to do with lay opinion evidence, were all not affected by the 2012 amendments.
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(2)  An expert is a person with such scientific, technical or other specialised 
knowledge based on training, study or experience.
(3)  The opinion of an expert shall not be irrelevant merely because the 
opinion or part thereof relates to a matter of common knowledge.
(4)  An opinion which is otherwise relevant under subsection (1) shall not 
be relevant if the court is of the view that it would not be in the interests 
of justice to treat it as relevant.
As can be seen from a quick comparison of the provisions, the most apparent 
changes, vis-à-vis the new subsections of section 47 respectively, are:
(1)  The specific categorisation approach (with regard to the areas of 
relevant expertise) has been replaced with a more general approach 
with likelihood of assistance to the court as the new touchstone for 
relevance.
(2)  The specific requirement of special skill has been replaced by a broad-
er requirement of training, study, or experience in the knowledge in 
question.
(3)  Expert opinion evidence based on common knowledge is expressly 
declared as not being an impediment to relevance.
(4)  The courts have now been expressly conferred discretion to exclude 
relevant evidence (i.e. expert opinion evidence in particular).12
(C) Overview of the Problems Unresolved or Brought About by the 
2012 Amendments
it is clear that the 2012 amendments, consistent with its original aims as set out by 
the Ministry of Law, broadened the scope of admissibility for expert opinion evi-
dence. indeed, this enlargement occurred for the amended hearsay provisions as 
well, which essentially relaxed the hearsay rule by increasing the number of statu-
tory exceptions to the rule.13 At the same time, for these two types of evidence—and 
these two types of evidence only—the courts are now expressly conferred the dis-
cretion to exclude relevant evidence (thus admissibility can be narrowed if neces-
sary) if ‘the court is of the view that it would not be in the interests of justice to treat 
it as relevant’.14 So what are the issues that have arisen then? in summary, the main 
problems, some unresolved by and some created by the 2012 amendments, are that:
(1)  it is still unclear if the EA defines ‘relevance’ as logical or legal 
relevance, notwithstanding the statute’s distinctive feature of being 
12 Something similar was done for the hearsay provisions that were amended: Proposed Amendments to 
the EA (n 5).
13 Consultation Amendments to the Evidence Act (n 10). Expert opinion evidence, of course, shares ‘a com-
mon foundation’ with hearsay evidence: Evidence and the Litigation Process (n 2), 273.
14 Section 32(3) of the EA, which is the main hearsay provision in the EA, uses this phrase as well.
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The 2012 Amendments to Singapore’s Evidence Act
a set of ‘inclusionary’ rather than ‘exclusionary’ rules.15 Concomi-
tantly, it is also still unclear if the EA only defines ‘relevance’ but 
does not actually go a step further to mandate admissibility by the 
court.16
(2)  it is also still unclear if Part i of the EA should be interpreted as bifur-
cating relevance into general relevance and specific relevance, in that 
any given piece of evidence must satisfy both the general relevancy 
(sections 6–11 of the EA) and specific relevancy (sections 12–57 of the 
EA) provisions before it can be admissible.17
(3)  it is unclear what ‘interests of justice’ entails and whether it uses the 
same test as and/or is based on the same justifications as the common 
law exclusionary discretion.18 This discretion, while of considerable 
pedigree in other common law jurisdictions, has barely been expli-
cated in Singapore even though it has been invoked from time to time. 
Concomitantly, it is also unclear if the courts have the discretion to 
exclude relevant evidence that is neither expert opinion nor hearsay 
evidence and, if so, whether there can be a basis and principle for this 
power that is consistent with the EA.
These three problems are all closely connected in that they all concern the ques-
tion of relevance under the EA. however, there is one other related but distinct 
issue that remains unresolved even after the 2012 amendments (and which was 
alluded to by both the Ministry of Law and LRC Report) and merits at least brief 
discussion.19 Specifically:
(4)  it is still unclear whether the ‘ultimate issue rule’ has any application 
in Singapore—that is to say, whether an expert witness (instead of the 
trial judge) is permitted to (in effect) make a finding with regard to a 
15 This means that the EA codifies exceptions to the common law ‘exclusionary’ rules, rather than the 
‘exclusionary’ rules themselves. See generally Robert Margolis ‘The Concept of Relevance: in the 
Evidence Act and the Modern View’ [1990] Singapore Law Review 11, 24; Report of the Law Reform 
Committee on Opinion Evidence (n 8), 6–10.
16 See Evidence and the Litigation Process (n 2), 368–70.
17 ibid, 35–42; Tan yock Lin ‘Stephen’s hearsay – Does it Matter?’ [1991] Singapore Law Review 12, 
128–30.
18 See generally Tan yock Lin ‘Sing a Song of Sang, a Pocketful of Woes?’ [1992] Singapore Journal of 
Legal Studies 2, 365; Jeffrey Pinsler SC, ‘Whether a Singapore Court has a Discretion to Exclude 
Evidence Admissible in Criminal Proceedings’ [2010] Singapore Academy of Law Journal 22, 335; 
Chen Siyuan ‘The Judicial Discretion to Exclude Relevant Evidence: Perspectives from an indian 
Evidence Act Jurisdiction’ [2012] International Journal of Evidence and Proof 16, 398; Chen Siyuan 
and nicholas Poon ‘Reliability and Relevance as the Touchstones for Admissibility of Evidence in 
Criminal Proceedings’ [2012] Singapore Academy of Law Journal 24, 535.
19 There is actually one other issue: whether there is supposed to be a different (i.e. more lenient) 
approach for expert opinion evidence in medical negligence (or indeed, even other kinds of profes-
sional) disputes, and whether this difference in treatment can be sustained in law and/or as a matter 
of principle: see Evidence and the Litigation Process (n 2), 306–9; Disa Sim ‘Dr Khoo James v Gunapathy 
d/o Muniandy: implications for the Evaluation of Expert Testimony’ [2003] Singapore Journal of Legal 
Studies 2, 601, 603–8. however, as it is truly a distinct issue from the other four issues raised in this 
article, it will not be included here.
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fact in issue in a dispute.20 notably, in most other common law juris-
dictions (such as England and Australia), this rule has effectively been 
abolished or ignored by the courts.21 however, there is recent authority 
in Singapore to suggest that the rule is still well and alive here, though 
on balance it may well be more honoured in breach than in observance.
The four problems listed above will now be considered in turn.
2. the Problems Examined
(A) The Distinctions between Logical and Legal Relevance and 
Admissibility and Relevance
The LRC, and by extension the Ministry of Law, was very much aware of some of 
the fundamental constraints that have been presented by the EA since its enact-
ment. One such fundamental constraint was that:
The [EA] was drafted on Stephen’s22 idiosyncratic view that there should 
be no distinction between the concepts of relevance and admissibility. 
Therefore the [EA] attempts to define relevance as an intrinsic, ever-present 
connection between two facts rather than accepting that it is a process lead-
ing to a conclusion … Modern evidence law makes no attempt in this way 
to define what is ‘relevant’. The word ‘relevant’ is today used not in this 
closed sense but in a broad general sense to mean ‘rationally probative’. 
What is relevant … necessarily varies from case to case and issue to issue 
and is not susceptible to being enumerated in legislation.23
Another such fundamental constraint was that:
The second difference between the [EA] and modern evidence law is that 
the [EA] admits only evidence which [it] renders admissible (or ‘relevant’ 
in the language of the [EA]) … the [EA] establishes the law of evidence 
in Singapore as a series of inclusionary rules with a few exclusionary rules 
bolted on rather than as a set of exclusionary rules … unless evidence 
comes within an express inclusionary rule in the [EA], therefore, that evi-
dence cannot be received by the court … Modern evidence law is based on 
the principle that all relevant evidence is freely admissible subject only to 
20 See Evidence and the Litigation Process (n 2), 292–93; Report of the Law Reform Committee on Opinion 
Evidence (n 8), 2.
21 Colin Tapper, Cross & Tapper on Evidence (Oxford university Press, 2010), 538–39; Paul Roberts and 
Adrian Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence (Oxford university Press, 2010), 490–93; Adrian Keane, James 
Griffiths, and Paul McKeown, The Modern Law of Evidence (Oxford university Press, 2010), 542–43.
22 This refers to Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, the draftsman of the indian EA.
23 Report of the Law Reform Committee on Opinion Evidence (n 8), 7. See also Cross & Tapper on Evidence (n 
21), 65–6; Criminal Evidence (n 21), 100–2; The Modern Law of Evidence (n 21), 20–6.
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The 2012 Amendments to Singapore’s Evidence Act
exclusionary rules which have been carved out to ensure reliability, to pre-
vent unfair prejudice or to uphold an important principle of public policy.24
indeed, whether or not Stephen fully appreciated the distinctions between legal 
and logical relevance and admissibility and relevance has always been of some 
debate, though it would seem that the EA is based on legal rather than logical rel-
evance.25 in that sense, the EA is clearly different from the common law position 
in terms of how evidence is admitted; under the common law, the admissibility 
sequence is: is the evidence (logically) relevant? is the evidence engaged by an 
‘exclusionary’ rule? is the evidence nevertheless recognised as an exception to 
the applicable exclusionary rule?26 in contrast, under the EA, evidence is admis-
sible as long as it satisfies the test for relevancy under the EA, without more.27
But there is also a third fundamental constraint presented by the EA that has 
to be understood before any meaningful reform can take place. Quite apart from 
the fact that statutory law, by definition, takes precedence over case law, there 
is a particular provision in the EA that has proven to be rather vexing for a very 
long time. Section 2(2), which has since been repealed in many other indian EA 
jurisdictions28 but remains in Singapore’s EA, states that ‘All rules of evidence 
not contained in any written law, so far as such rules are inconsistent with any of 
the provisions of this Act, are repealed.’ Essentially, this meant (and still means) 
that ‘Singapore courts cannot rely on (the ever-changing) common law rules on 
evidence unless those rules are consistent with the (essentially static) [EA].’29
As a result of this stifling prohibition, section 2(2) of the EA ‘was virtually 
completely ignored or glossed over by Singapore courts in evidence law deci-
sions for more than a century … With the passage of time, the resultant unprin-
cipled importation of common law concepts created increasing contradictions 
between many provisions in the [EA] and Singapore case law.’30 This undesir-
able pattern only effectively came to a halt in 2008, when then Chief Justice Chan 
Sek Keong declared in Law Society of Singapore v. Tan Guat Neo Phyllis (Phyllis 
Tan) that section 2(2) of the EA could no longer be ignored but instead had to 
be properly adhered to.31 in making this declaration, the court must also have 
meant that the EA had to be interpreted in a way that was internally consis-
tent, in meaning, principle, and structure. At any rate, the upshot of the afore-
mentioned fundamental constraints then is that any treatment of the EA—be it 
judicial interpretation or legislative amendment—has to be prefaced with the 
24 Report of the Law Reform Committee on Opinion Evidence (n 8), 9 (emphasis in original).
25 Sing a Song of Sang (n 18), 371–73.
26 Criminal Evidence (n 21), 99.
27 Evidence and the Litigation Process (n 2), 38–43.
28 ‘The Judicial Discretion to Exclude Relevant Evidence’ (n 18), 400.
29 ibid.
30 ibid. See also Jeffrey Pinsler ‘Approaches to the Evidence Act: The Judicial Development of a Code’ 
[2002] Singapore Academy of Law Journal 14, 365; Chin Tet yung ‘Remaking the Evidence Code: Search 
for Values’ [2009] Singapore Academy of Law Journal 21, 52 at 53–5.
31 [2008] 2 SLR(R) 239 (Court of Three Judges (Singapore)) [117]. This was affirmed in subsequent cases 
such as Lee Chez Kee v. Public Prosecutor [2008] 3 SLR(R) 447 (Singapore Court of Appeal (SCGA)) 
[116] and Muhammad bin Kadar v. Public Prosecutor [2011] 3 SLR 1205 (SGCA) [51].
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exercise of determining what relevance and admissibility in the EA actually 
entails, before recourse to common law developments can take place. For the 
larger part of history, this simply has not been done in any meaningful way by 
the Singapore courts or legislature.32
how, then, have the 2012 amendments fared in terms of resolving the mean-
ing of relevance and admissibility in the EA, in accordance with the EA? The 
records of the parliamentary debates, unfortunately, are bereft of clues in this 
regard33 and the statutory text is all there is for our evaluation. At first blush, 
it would seem that the amended section 47(1) (which should also be read with 
the new section 47(3)), in broadening the test for relevance (from a categorisa-
tion approach to the touchstone of likelihood of assistance to the court), has 
conceptualised relevance in a logical sense by allowing the judge, rather than 
the EA, to determine relevance on a case-by-case basis—the only limiting (and 
therefore legal) mechanism is that the evidence must be with regard to ‘sci-
entific, technical or other specialised knowledge’.34 however, as mentioned, 
the EA adopts an ‘inclusionary’ approach to the common law ‘exclusionary’ 
rules, and in so far as the amended section 47 takes cognisance of that (by 
defining what is relevant rather than what is prima facie irrelevant), it is odd 
that amongst all the ‘exclusionary’ rules in the EA, only expert opinion now 
defines relevance as broadly as it does (the discretion in the new section 47(4) 
would be addressed soon enough). The necessary inference to be drawn is 
that expert opinion evidence is considered potentially more useful (or perhaps 
instrumental) than other types of evidence constrained by ‘exclusionary’ rules 
in the disposition of cases, given that Parliament did not mind risking being 
over-inclusive than under-inclusive in the judicial reception of such evidence. 
indeed, the introduction of section 47(3) (which states that common knowl-
edge is not a bar to an opinion being relevant) indicates confidence in the 
judiciary to attach the appropriate caution to expertise that may appear less 
necessary than it is.
32 The closest attempt is found in the Report of the Law Reform Committee on Opinion Evidence (n 8), 6–10. 
See also Basil Anthony Herman v. Premier Security Co-operative Ltd [2010] 3 SLR 110 (SCGA) [24]–[26]: 
‘every litigant has a general right to bring all evidence relevant to his or her case to the attention of 
the court. This general right is so fundamental that it requires no authority to be cited in support 
of it ... The general right is, of course, subject to specific limits … A litigant only has the right to 
adduce relevant evidence, as defined by the [EA] and other applicable rules; irrelevant evidence is 
inadmissible and will not be considered by the court. The adduction of relevant evidence must, as 
far as practicable, take place in accordance with the rules of procedure whose purpose is to ensure 
the fair, economical, swift and orderly resolution of a dispute. Finally, a litigant is prohibited from 
manipulating the court’s machinery to further his ulterior or collateral motives in an abusive or 
oppressive manner … a trial judge must not only be guided by the applicable rules and decisions, 
but must look beyond the mechanical application of these rules and decisions, and carefully assess 
the interests at stake in every case to ensure that a fair outcome is reached through the application of 
fair processes’ (emphasis in original).
33 in fact, the records would suggest that Parliament was either not aware of the difference between 
legal and logical relevance or placed no importance on it whatsoever.
34 notably, under the old section 47(1) of the EA, ‘science or art’ and ‘specially skilled’ were defined 
very broadly by the courts: Evidence and the Litigation Process (n 2), 281–84.
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The 2012 Amendments to Singapore’s Evidence Act
Of course, inclusiveness presupposes that relevance is equated with admis-
sibility (automatic or otherwise), and in this connection, it is noteworthy that the 
amended section 47 only uses the language of relevance and does not mention 
admissibility at all. indeed, the phrase ‘An opinion which is otherwise relevant 
under subsection (1) shall not be relevant’ seems to equate relevance with admis-
sibility.35 Without elaborating on the problems of the new section 47(4) at this 
point, the fact that a court needs to be conferred discretion to reverse the rel-
evance of a piece of (expert opinion) evidence that is found relevant under the EA 
would arguably suggest that the fulfilment of relevance must lead to admissibil-
ity; otherwise, the conferral of this discretion would be completely unnecessary 
as the evidence need not be excluded but may just not be admitted since there 
is no automatic admissibility. On another view, such discretion can coherently 
coexist with the notion that the EA does not mandate admissibility, particularly 
in instances where a piece of evidence has doubtful relevance (though this is pre-
cisely where the concept of weight comes in, which will also be addressed later). 
nevertheless, there is actually another logically prior and connected question to 
consider, to which we now turn to.
(B) The Distinction between General  
Relevance and Specific Relevance
One of the enduring and great mysteries of the EA is why Stephen saw fit 
to divide the relevancy provisions in the EA into general and specific cat-
egories. The specific relevancy provisions (sections 12–57 of the EA) roughly 
correspond to the common law ‘exclusionary’ rules expressed in ‘inclusion-
ary’ terms,36 but the purpose and ambit of the general relevancy provisions 
(sections 6–11 of the EA) and their relationship with the specific relevancy 
provisions remain controversial. For instance, does a piece of evidence have 
to satisfy both the general and specific relevancy provisions before it can 
be considered relevant (and admissible)?37 The case law on this is rather 
divided, and in any event, all of them pre-date Phyllis Tan and would prob-
ably not have considered the EA in its proper terms.38 There is no particu-
lar rule of statutory construction that applies to break this deadlock either. 
Compounding this problem is that some cases have interpreted some of the 
general relevancy provisions as ‘inclusionary’ expressions of the common law 
‘exclusionary’ rules as well. The classic example, but by no means the only 
35 however, as pointed out in ibid 372, ‘[Section] 5 of the EA, the governing provision on admissibility, 
does not compel the court to admit relevant evidence. The section points to the different categories 
of admissible evidence which the parties may rely on and does not deprive the court of its power to 
exclude such evidence.’
36 ibid, 39–40.
37 See also ‘The Judicial Discretion to Exclude Relevant Evidence’ (n 18), 403–5.
38 Evidence and the Litigation Process (n 2), 40–3; Chen Siyuan ‘Revisiting the Similar Fact Rule in 
Singapore’ [2011] Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 2, 553, 559–61.
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example,39 is that of the similar fact rule. it is widely accepted that this rule, 
which ‘essentially limits the admissibility of evidence that goes not towards 
proving directly that an accused has committed the crime he has been charged 
with but towards his past conduct, and that may form a basis for inferring 
that the accused has committed the said crime’, is found in sections 14 and 
15 of the EA.40 however, it is equally widely accepted that sections 14 and 
15 only address the mens rea aspect of the rule, and say nothing about actus 
reus.41 Because of this lacuna, the courts have interpreted the actus reus aspect 
of the similar fact rule to be found in section 11 of the EA, which is not specific 
but a general relevancy provision.42 Section 11 states that:
11. Facts not otherwise relevant are relevant—
(a) if they are inconsistent with any fact in issue or relevant fact;
(b) if by themselves or in connection with other facts they make the exis-
tence or non-existence of any fact in issue or relevant fact highly probable 
or improbable.
Section 11, and subsection (b) in particular, is very broadly worded and may 
‘give the impression that it is a residuary provision for admitting relevant facts 
which may not be caught by the preceding five sections [of general relevancy]’.43 
however, much as Stephen ‘was aware that s 11(b) might be interpreted broadly 
… and indicated that this was not the intention of the section’,44 the similar fact 
rule cases that have abolished the boundary between the general and specific 
relevancy provisions continue to validate the possibility that a piece of evidence, 
regardless of its ‘exclusionary’ nature, need only satisfy one of the relevancy pro-
visions in the EA. That the 2012 amendments to the rules on expert opinion evi-
dence have done nothing to dispel this problem is of some concern.
To elaborate, while it is true that a court is likely to rule that expert opinion 
evidence that is clearly captured by section 47(1) of the EA must at least satisfy 
section 47(1), the first conundrum that emerges is whether that evidence must 
satisfy one of the general relevancy provisions in sections 6–11 of the EA as 
well. The second conundrum, and perhaps the more important one in terms of 
practical implications, is whether expert opinion evidence that does not satisfy 
39 Evidence and the Litigation Process (n 2), 42–3. Another example would be the hearsay rule; specifi-
cally, the res gestae exception that is found in section 6 of the EA.
40 ‘Revisiting the Similar Fact Rule’ (n 38), 557–61.
41 ho hock Lai ‘An introduction to Similar Fact Evidence’ [1998] Sing Law Review 19, 166, 186–88. 
Section 14 of the EA states that ‘Facts showing the existence of any state of mind, such as intention, 
knowledge, good faith, negligence, rashness, ill-will or good-will towards any particular person, or 
showing the existence of any state of body or bodily feeling, are relevant when the existence of any 
such state of mind or body or bodily feeling is in issue or relevant.’ Section 15 of the EA states that 
‘When there is a question whether an act was accidental or intentional or done with a particular 
knowledge or intention, the fact that such act formed part of a series of similar occurrences, in each 
of which the person doing the act was concerned, is relevant.’
42 ‘Revisiting the Similar Fact Rule’ (n 38), 563–64.
43 Evidence and the Litigation Process (n 2), 55.
44 ibid.
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section 47(1) of the EA (and section 47(2) for the matter) may nevertheless be 
admitted via one of the general relevancy provisions instead, given that it is 
conceivably unobjectionable to do so as ‘exclusionary’ rules do not, especially 
in the context of the EA, circumscribe the scope of all potentially admissible 
evidence—in other words one simply needs to re-characterise a piece of evi-
dence as not being captured by an ‘exclusionary’ rule to bypass it.45 in the 
context of expert opinion evidence, it seems plausible that one only needs to 
avoid labelling a piece of evidence as expert opinion to avoid engaging section 
47—provided, of course, that the evidence does not engage other ‘exclusionary’ 
rules, such as (and most particularly) hearsay.46 indeed, while the LRC Report 
demonstrated its awareness of the significance of the distinctions between logi-
cal and relevance and relevance and admissibility, it did not seem to be aware 
of this further distinction between general and specific relevance in the EA—
which may also explain why it saw a need to recommend introducing the com-
mon knowledge rule via section 47(3).47 if it had appreciated the distinction 
between general and specific relevance, it would have noted that the need to 
statutorily introduce the non-prohibition against the common knowledge rule 
would have been potentially obviated by the general relevancy provisions in 
the EA, but there was simply no discussion of this distinction in its report. if 
anything, it just goes to show that the LRC—and Parliament—still do not fully 
appreciate the section 2(2) interface between the common law (of which the 
common knowledge rule entirely finds its origins) and the EA, and in effect 
considered common law developments as the first port of call when consider-
ing reforms for the EA.48 But if the problems raised in this and previous section 
seem minor, theoretical, or even solvable, the third problem that was created 
by the 2012 amendments is too large to be ignored, and crucially is a direct 
consequence of the legislature’s failure to properly consider and understand 
the EA’s conceptualisation and arrangement of the relevancy provisions as out-
lined thus far.
45 As explained, Phyllis Tan was a watershed decision mainly because many decisions before it 
had conveniently ignored the EA when it came to matters of evidence. it seems ironic then that 
Parliament should ignore the clarion call in Phyllis Tan and amend the EA without due regard of its 
structural and conceptual complexities and limitations. interestingly, Chan Sek Keong, when he was 
Attorney-General, proposed that it would be better for the judiciary to bypass the EA altogether, 
instead of citing it at whim. he wrote in his seminal article (‘The Criminal Process – The Singapore 
Model’ [1996] Sing Law Review 17, 431, 456): ‘in a jury trial relevant evidence may be withdrawn 
from the jury if the judge considers that its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value. There are 
a number of situations where this principle is applicable. This principle should have little or no rel-
evance in bench trials as the judge can simply give whatever weight is appropriate to the evidence. 
There is no need for a judge to go through the formal process of declaring the evidence inadmissible. 
But our courts continue to deal with such evidence in this fashion.’
46 See also Report of the Law Reform Committee on Opinion Evidence (n 8), 47–67.
47 ibid, 6–10, 21–25.
48 The LRC Report had largely surveyed the English, Australian, and new Zealand position in making 
its recommendation; as regards Singapore, it noted that there were hardly any cases that were on 
point: ibid, 11–25.
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(C)  The Chimerical Discretion to Exclude Admissible Evidence
until the 2012 amendments, the EA was completely silent on whether the courts 
had the discretion to exclude evidence that were otherwise relevant (and admis-
sible) under the EA. This may not be surprising if one considers that there is 
little to suggest that Stephen was aware of this concept of the judicial discre-
tion to exclude relevance when he was drafting the indian EA (which was essen-
tially replicated in the EA).49 But more importantly, even if he was aware of it, 
the structure and conceptualisation of relevancy in the EA as outlined above are 
fundamentally at odds with such a concept, no matter its established nature at 
common law.50 Furthermore and most importantly, the scope and normative jus-
tification for this judicial discretion, in Singapore at least, is replete with inter-
nal contradictions and unresolved ambiguities. Two recent commentaries have 
already discussed these at some length,51 but to use a striking illustration for 
now, the use of the discretion has most recently been justified (but certainly not 
always) on the basis of an exercise of the courts’ inherent jurisdictional powers.52 
however, this:
[E]ffectively presupposes that relevance under the [EA] does not amount 
to admissibility, but this remains a contentious point. Secondly, extreme 
caution is always urged in the exercise of a court’s remedial justified 
under the auspice of inherent jurisdiction, in that the precondition is the 
circumstances of the case must be ‘exceptional’.53 Thirdly, such a constric-
tive requirement of ‘exceptional’ circumstances plainly does not square 
with the fact that … the exclusionary discretion as presently conceived 
can be applied expansively in the context of all common law exclusionary 
rules and executive improprieties, whether captured by the [EA] or oth-
erwise.54 Fourth, while it is probably less controversial (but not without 
problems) to suggest that the court’s inherent jurisdiction can be invoked 
to prevent an abuse of the judicial process so as to preserve its moral 
legitimacy, [cases’] equating of inherent jurisdiction with the prevention 
of injustice is a substantially different and broader idea, and may consti-
tute going one step too far (in terms of expanding what is supposed to be 
a narrow ambit of powers exercised pursuant to inherent jurisdiction). 
Fifthly, even if inherent jurisdiction is limited to the power to prevent an 
abuse of process, there is a reason to believe that power can actually be 
used to remedy entrapment issues—a paradox arises though, when one 
49 Evidence and the Litigation Process (n 2), 345–74; Criminal Evidence (n 21), 73–5.
50 ‘The Judicial Discretion to Exclude Relevant Evidence’ (n 18), 400–1. See also VR Manohar (ed), 
Ratalanlal & Dhirajlal’s The Law of Evidence (Lexisnexis, 2012), 65–6, 80–1.
51 ‘The Judicial Discretion to Exclude Relevant Evidence’ (n 18); ‘Reliability and Relevance as the 
Touchstones for Admissibility’ (n 18).
52 Muhammad bin Kadar (n 31) [52]. See also Evidence and the Litigation Process (n 2), 345–74.
53 Evidence and the Litigation Process (n 2), 363.
54 ibid, 359; ‘Reliability and Relevance as the Touchstones for Admissibility’ (n 18), 537–38.
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considers that the defence of entrapment has been categorically rejected 
in Singapore.55
But as mentioned, the judicial discretion to exclude evidence has also occasionally 
been justified on the basis of fairness of trial (which appears similar to the phrase 
‘interests of justice’ in the new section 47(4) of the EA).56 however, ‘while the idea 
of fairness of trial may be conceived to include broader, non-epistemic consider-
ations such as rights protection and the moral legitimacy of the criminal justice 
process, the cases seem to define fairness of trial more narrowly … not so much 
open-ended concepts such as justice or fairness (or indeed, “basic procedural 
fairness”), but, at bottom, reliability (of the evidence).’57 Then there is the justi-
fication of the need to ensure minimum standards of law enforcement,58 which 
is premised on ‘the hope that the potential exercise of the court’s exclusionary 
discretion may lead to law enforcement officers having less incentive to breach 
procedural safeguards’ and that ‘the judiciary has a duty to ... prevent the courts 
from abetting or endorsing flagrant improprieties’.59 however, not only has this 
been rejected in other jurisdictions as the primary justification for the concept of 
judicial discretion to exclude evidence, it has been rejected in Singapore as well.60
yet quite apart from finding a consistent and persuasive justification for the use of 
this discretion, the real problem brought about by the 2012 amendments is that the 
new section 47(4) uses language that is more likely to confuse than not. The full text 
of the subsection reads: ‘An opinion which is otherwise relevant under subsection 
(1) shall not be relevant if the court is of the view that it would not be in the interests 
of justice to treat it as relevant.’ This is confusing language because the preponder-
ance of Singapore cases has (rightly or wrongly) translated the judicial discretion 
to exclude evidence into the test of weighing the probative value of the evidence 
against its prejudicial effect.61 While the terms ‘probative value’ and ‘prejudicial 
effect’ are not without their own set of intractable (definitional and operational) 
problems,62 why would the 2012 amendments introduce a test that bears no obvi-
ous relation to the longstanding test in the local cases and common law?63 What 
55 ‘The Judicial Discretion to Exclude Relevant Evidence’ (n 18), 406.
56 ‘Reliability and Relevance as the Touchstones for Admissibility’ (n 18), 544–45.
57 ‘The Judicial Discretion to Exclude Relevant Evidence’ (n 18), 410–11.
58 ibid, 412–14.
59 ‘Reliability and Relevance as the Touchstones for Admissibility’ (n 18), 546.
60 Muhammad bin Kadar (n 31) [68].
61 ‘Reliability and Relevance as the Touchstones for Admissibility’ (n 18), 539.
62 ‘The Judicial Discretion to Exclude Relevant Evidence’ (n 18), 406–10; ‘Revisiting the Similar Fact 
Rule’ (n 38), 561–63. The main objections raised by some of the commentators are that there are no 
settled definitions for ‘prejudice’ and ‘probative value’ (see also Michael hor ‘Similar Fact Evidence 
in Singapore: Probative Value, Prejudice and Politics’ [1999] Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 48, 
50–1) and that the weighability of the two against each other is problematic.
63 indeed, even at English common law, the test has largely been superseded by section 78(1) of the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (c 60), which states: ‘in any proceedings the court may refuse 
to allow evidence on which the prosecution proposes to rely to be given if it appears to the court 
that, having regard to all the circumstances, including the circumstances in which the evidence was 
obtained, the admission of the evidence would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the 
proceedings that the court ought not to admit it.’
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does ‘interests of justice’ mean, and can it possibly mean anything more than what 
a court of law is supposed to uphold in any given case anyway, regardless of the 
context? And will not such a broad term contradict the inherent nature of the inher-
ent power, which is supposed to be exercised only in exceptional and narrow cir-
cumstances? A further source of puzzlement was astutely pointed out by a Member 
of Parliament during the parliamentary debates leading to the 2012 amendments:
[For the] new section 32(3), which gives the court a residual power to 
exclude hearsay evidence in the interest of justice. i  would recommend 
that, instead of creating narrow safety valves in the provisions on hearsay, 
and also in the provisions on expert evidence in the new section 47(4), why 
not create a broad statutory power in a standalone provision of the Act 
allowing the court to exclude, in the interest of justice, any evidence that 
would otherwise be relevant and admissible under the provisions of the 
Act? This would put existing case law on a firm statutory footing.64
however, the Minister of Law replied as follows:
[The discretion in section 47(4)] is in addition to the court’s inherent juris-
diction to exclude prejudicial evidence … The courts’ discretion to exclude 
hearsay or expert opinion evidence in the interest of justice, as set out in the 
Bill, is—and i emphasise this—in addition to its general power to exclude 
prejudicial evidence at common law. Such a general power stems from the 
courts’ inherent jurisdiction, and our preference is to leave that unlegis-
lated. Let us see how the courts exercise this power, whether it creates prob-
lems or whether it works well, and we will keep this under review.65
The Member of Parliament would probably not have found the reply from the 
Minister fully satisfactory. indeed, why should the discretion be statutorily con-
ferred only for hearsay and expert opinion evidence? how about similar fact 
evidence, character evidence, improperly obtained evidence, procedurally non-
compliant evidence, or any evidence that may be relevant under the EA but 
potentially prejudicial? To return to an earlier point, the claim of a ‘general power 
to exclude prejudicial evidence at common law’, in all likelihood, was not made 
with the proper contemplation of the contentious scope and normative justifica-
tion for this judicial discretion. And by saying that this discretion is ‘in addition 
to [the courts’] general power to exclude prejudicial evidence at common law’, 
does this mean that the test of ‘in the interests of justice’ is in addition to the com-
mon law test of probative value versus prejudicial effect, such that there is now 
a two-staged test? Finally, it is noteworthy that the LRC had actually proposed a 
more internally consistent (but nevertheless flawed) suggestion as regards sec-
tion 47(4), but this was, for reasons not fully explicated, not taken up:
This inclusionary rule should also be subject to an express exclusionary 
discretion permitting the court to exclude otherwise admissible evidence if 
64 Singapore Parliamentary Debates Official Report (n 6).
65 ibid.
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it is unfairly prejudicial, misleading or confusing or will lead to an undue 
waste of judicial time. however, as that exclusionary discretion will cut 
across all categories of admissible evidence and not just expert evidence, 
we have not suggested the shape that that exclusionary discretion should 
take …66
What, then, is a plausible solution to this unsatisfactory state of affairs? The ideal 
solution is to repeal the EA altogether—repealing section 2(2), which has created 
an uneasy interface between the EA and common law, would not be enough. 
This much-maligned statute, despite it representing a valiant endeavour to com-
prehensively codify the law of evidence in Singapore, has been ignored by the 
courts for decades, and even if cases subsequent to Phyllis Tan have attempted 
to reconcile the common law (including English law, which is constantly sub-
ject to reform) and the EA, sometimes they have come across as struggling to fit 
square pegs into round holes.67 The LRC had also rightly pointed out that the 
EA continues to be built on certain normative assumptions that may be ques-
tioned in modern evidence law discourse, so there is really little reason to keep 
the EA.68 But since the EA was amended only as recently as 2012, the possibil-
ity for repeal—as is the possibility for a complete makeover, as was done for 
the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC)69—is extremely low indeed. in the circum-
stances, one simply has to construct and adopt an interpretive framework for the 
EA that correctly identifies the conceptualisation and underpinning principles 
of the statute. To this end, and with specific regard to the question of whether a 
piece of evidence is relevant and admissible under the EA, it has been suggested 
that since the fact-finding process in Singapore is no longer by a jury but by a 
trial judge who has the professional expertise to properly consider and weigh 
evidence for its relevance and prejudice (something that the Ministry of Law also 
noted),70 the following approach may be adopted as it is also more in line with 
the conceptualisation and principles of the EA:
[i]nstead of using the balancing test (probative value versus prejudicial 
effect) to determine if a piece of evidence should be admitted or excluded; 
instead of asking whether there is any unfairness or injustice to be pre-
vented; and instead of calling upon the court’s residuary discretion and 
inherent powers to exclude otherwise admissible evidence, the appropriate 
(and narrower) question to ask after a piece of evidence is deemed relevant 
66 Report of the Law Reform Committee on Opinion Evidence (n 8), 4–5.
67 For instance, in the context of similar fact rule, the Singapore courts continue to cite English cases 
that have long been superseded by statute, such as the Criminal Justice Act 2003. however, the 
courts do not even discuss such statutes in their similar fact rule decisions.
68 Report of the Law Reform Committee on Opinion Evidence (n 8), 6–10. See also ‘Remaking the Evidence 
Code’ (n 30), 95–6.
69 Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) (Singapore). up until 2012, this was known as the 
Criminal Procedure Code 2010 to disambiguate it from its predecessor.
70 Consultation Amendments to the Evidence Act (n 10)  [8]–[9]. See also Wong Kim Poh v.  Public 
Prosecutor [1992] 1 SLR(R) 13 (SGCA) [14]; Tan Chee Kieng v. Public Prosecutor [1994] 2 SLR(R) 577 
(SGCA) [8]; Tan Meng Jee v. Public Prosecutor [1996] SLR(R) 178 (SGCA) [48].
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(as determined by the [EA]) is whether that evidence is also reliable. The 
reliability of a piece of evidence will depend on the facts of each case, with 
references to the requirements established by statute (such as the [EA] and 
[CPC]). in contrast, the balancing test … will depend on vague notions of 
prejudicial effect, unfairness or injustice conceptualised broadly, and the 
hazy sense of when recourse to the court’s inherent jurisdiction is accept-
able … once the threshold of reliability is satisfied, the evidence is admis-
sible—there is no residual discretion exercisable to deny admissibility of 
the evidence … As regards relevance, insofar as almost a third of the [EA] 
is devoted to relevancy provisions, it is clear that relevance is one of the 
touchstones of admissibility … As regards reliability, it is by no means a 
novel idea that it also forms a key foundation … Singapore courts rou-
tinely refer to reliability as the most crucial consideration when admitting 
evidence.71 Should a court be unsure as to the precise reliability of a piece 
of evidence, it can always admit the evidence first and subsequently attach 
less weight to it if necessary … [This] acts as a more useful discretion for the 
judge than the balancing test …72
indeed, the amended section 47(2) of the EA actually confirms that reliability is 
the twin to the touchstone of relevance when determining admissibility under 
the EA. That the subsection requires a witness can only be properly called an 
expert if he or she has ‘such scientific, technical or other specialised knowledge 
based on training, study or experience’ is an affirmation of the fundamental 
importance of reliability in the EA (and indeed, evidence law generally in many 
jurisdictions).73 happily, section 47(2) is also consistent with a long line of cases 
in Singapore that had supplemented the scope of admissibility under the old 
section 47 by holding that expert opinion evidence must be inherently and objec-
tively reliable (as determined by the judge) before it can be considered relevant.74 
not so happily, the new section 47(4), for the foregoing reasons, will create more 
problems than solve them.
71 See also ‘Reliability and Relevance as the Touchstones for Admissibility’ (n 18), 547–49.
72 ‘The Judicial Discretion to Exclude Relevant Evidence’ (n 18), 416, 419–20. Several advantages of 
adopting this paradigm were also highlighted: relevance and reliability is also the touchstone for 
the admissibility of statements made by the accused; there will no longer be any potential double 
standards between entrapment evidence (which cannot be excluded even by judicial discretion) and 
other types of improperly obtained evidence that is more prejudicial than probative (which can be 
excluded); and it obviates the need for a distinct test that applies to ‘exclusionary’ rules, since reli-
ability is capable of being a basis for the ‘exclusionary’ rules as well as a test in and of itself. See also 
Chen Siyuan ‘Dealing with unreliable Evidence’ [2011] Singapore Law Watch Commentaries; Chen 
Siyuan and nicholas Poon ‘The inadmissibility of unreliable Self-inculpatory Statements’ (2012) 
Singapore Law Watch Commentaries.
73 See generally Michael hor ‘When Experts Disagree’ [2003] Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 2, 241; 
Jeffrey Pinsler ‘Expert’s Duty to be Truthful in the Light of the Rules of Court’ [2004] Singapore 
Academy of Law Journal 16, 407.
74 See, for instance, Saeng-Un Udom v.  Public Prosecutor [2001] 2 SLR(R) 1 (SGCA) [27]; Dr Lo Sook 
Ling Adela v. Au Mei Yin Christina [2002] 1 SLR(R) 326 (SGCA) [48]; Sakthivel Punithavathi v. Public 
Prosecutor [2007] 2 SLR(R) 983 (Singapore high Court) [75]; Ong Pang Siew v. Public Prosecutor [2011] 
1 SLR 606 (SGCA) [66]–[73]; and Eu Lim Hoklai v. Public Prosecutor [2011] 3 SLR 167 (SGCA) [53]–[59].
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(D)  The Continued Applicability of the ‘Ultimate Issue Rule’
So much for relevance and admissibility; we now move on briefly to a related 
but slightly distinct issue that could have been addressed by the 2012 amend-
ments to section 47. it pertains to the ‘ultimate issue rule’. The Ministry of Law 
was certainly aware of the importance of this rule when it said that the ratio-
nale for the expert opinion rule is the danger that fact-finders may ‘place undue 
emphasis on expert opinions and abdicate their ultimate responsibility to draw 
their own conclusions on all the relevant facts’;75 so too the LRC Report, which 
identified the ‘ultimate issue rule’ as one of the main rules governing expert 
opinion evidence in some common law jurisdictions.76 interestingly, certain 
indian commentators have taken the position that the rule is somehow covered 
by section 45 of the indian EA—section 45 being the exact equivalent of section 
47 of the EA before it was amended in 2012.77 Be that as it may, the Singapore 
courts have never confronted this rule directly.78 A recent Court of Appeal deci-
sion came rather close to doing this, where Judge of Appeal VK Rajah pointed 
out that:
Expert evidence will not always offer a clear answer to every question 
before the court. This does not excuse a judge from making a crucial find-
ing of fact. ultimately, all questions—whether law or of fact—placed before 
a court are intended to be adjudicated by a judge and not by experts. An 
expert or scientific witness is there only to assist the court in arriving at its 
decision; he or she is not there to arrogate the court’s functions to himself 
or herself.79
Although (as mentioned above) the ‘ultimate issue rule’ has largely been 
abandoned or modified in other common law jurisdictions, the rule is argu-
ably still relevant in Singapore today. Apart from the passage cited above, 
in the particular context of Singapore, a logical impasse is reached when a 
judge is faced with conflicting expert opinion evidence that effectively goes 
toward answering an ‘ultimate issue’ but agrees with neither point of view: 
on the one hand, local case law dictates that he is ‘restricted to electing or 
choosing between conflicting expert evidence’ and cannot under any circum-
stance give his own opinion (though he is free to reject both opinions),80 
but on the other hand, he is expected to be the only (and final) arbiter of 
75 Consultation Amendments to the Evidence Act (n 10) [8].
76 Report of the Law Reform Committee on Opinion Evidence (n 8), 2.
77 Ratalanlal & Dhirajlal’s The Law of Evidence (n 50), 376–77.
78 Evidence and the Litigation Process (n 2), 292–93.
79 Eu Lim Hoklai (n 73) [44]. The judge went on to add, however, in the same paragraph: ‘Where the 
scientific evidence fails to provide a precise answer … the court must resort to the usual methods 
it employs in all other cases which do not require expert evidence: that is—namely—the sifting, 
weighing and evaluating the objective facts within their circumstantial matrix and context in order 
to arrive at a final finding of fact.’
80 Saeng-Un Udom (n 73) [26].
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the ‘ultimate issue’.81 Many common law commentators have also observed 
upward trends of fact-finders deferring disproportionately to expert opinion 
evidence, particularly in (but certainly not limited to) the fields of complex 
and/or emerging areas of science.82 Would the 2012 amendments, which on 
the whole broadened (as was intended) the admissibility of expert opinion 
evidence, comport with such fears?83 if so, did Parliament then think that 
further statutorily confirming the abolition of the ‘ultimate issue rule’ would 
go one step too far in broadening admissibility, at least at this point in time? 
Whichever the case, it seems that it has avoided deciding conclusively on 
(or even addressing) the matter for now, unlike the legislature in Australia, 
which had repealed the rule via section 80(a) of its Evidence Act 2011,84 and 
in England, which had also repealed the rule (for civil proceedings) via sec-
tion 3 of the Civil Evidence Act 197285 and has progressively cast doubt on 
the rule in criminal proceedings over the last few decades.86
81 See also Scott Brewer ‘Scientific Expert Testimony and intellectual Due Process’ [1998] Yale Law 
Journal 107, 1535, 1679–80: ‘[T]here is a structured reasoning process that a nonexpert judge … must 
use in an effort to take account of scientific expert testimony in the course of reaching a legal deci-
sion about … guilt … When one attends carefully to the precise steps of the reasoning process, one 
sees that there are crucial steps that a nonexpert judge … is, in a great many instances, not capable of 
performing in an epistemically nonarbitrary manner. Specifically, when competing scientific experts 
are, for all the nonexpert knows, fairly evenly matched in credentials, reputation, and demeanor, 
and when no generally accessible rational criteria … break the ‘tie’ … then a nonexpert is not capa-
ble of choosing among the competing experts in an epistemically nonarbitrary way.’
82 See, for instance, Criminal Evidence (n 21), 502–9; Ratalanlal & Dhirajlal’s The Law of Evidence (n 50), 
376–77.
83 in Singapore, there was even a recent debate on the ‘ultimate issue rule’: see Andy ho ‘Keeping 
an Eye on Expert Witnesses’, The Straits Times, 19 January 2013 (‘the court has repeatedly stressed 
a high degree of deference to its scientific findings and an unwillingness to scrutinise them … This 
hands-off approach of appeals courts is indeed the norm in most common law countries … The tra-
ditional rationale for this approach is that the lower court sees all witnesses in person, so its judge 
is best positioned to assess their credibility. But even if this were so, the standard for admitting an 
expert witness is very lax … Given that a judge is unlikely to be also a scientist, the one admissible 
as a science expert need not be very highly qualified, in theory … in practice, once admitted as an 
expert, almost any evidence he offers becomes admissible. his bare say-so could convict, which 
would be a miscarriage of justice if the highest court will not review the science on appeal’) and 
Zaheer Merchant ‘Easing Concerns Over Expert Views’, The Straits Times, 25 January 2013 (‘Expert 
evidence is a complex area of the law. The Singapore courts are keenly aware that expert evidence 
should not deal with the “ultimate issue” … Any expert evidence to be admissible in court and at 
trial first has to pass fairly stringent admissibility criteria, which finds its substratum in statute … 
supplanted by common law, and other procedural challenges. having been admitted, the evidence 
is then tested by rigorous cross-examination, aside from being evaluated against other experts’ 
views. Experts also clearly have a duty not to the party who calls them to testify, but predominantly 
to the court. The court evaluates the weight to be placed on the expert evidence in its decision. it 
does not simply make a decision based solely on or by reason of an expert opinion … in Singapore, 
the high Court and Court of Appeal … recognise and are able to distinguish the roles and value of 
expert evidence’).
84 Section 80(a) states: ‘Evidence of an opinion is not inadmissible only because it is about a fact in 
issue or an ultimate issue.’
85 Section 3(1) states: ‘where a person is called as a witness in any civil proceedings, his opinion on any 
relevant matter on which he is qualified to give expert evidence shall be admissible in evidence.’ 
Section 3(3) states: ‘in this section ‘relevant matter’ includes an issue in the proceedings in question.’
86 Cross & Tapper on Evidence (n 21), 538–40. 
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3. concluding remarks
in this article, i  have argued that the 2012 amendments to the expert opinion 
provisions in the EA may have raised more questions than answered them. it 
is likely that Parliament had not properly appreciated the conceptualisation, 
structure, and principles of the EA—particularly with regard to relevancy and 
admissibility—before it passed the amendments. This has culminated in the 
introduction of a completely new test for excluding relevant expert opinion evi-
dence, and this is without first mentioning the problem of confining this test to 
expert opinion and hearsay evidence. Parliament has also passed on the oppor-
tunity to clarify the law on the ‘ultimate issue rule’, and though this is perhaps 
mitigated by trends elsewhere in other common law jurisdictions, it does under-
score the unique importance attached to expert opinion evidence and confirm an 
increasingly popular philosophy towards it: Expert opinion evidence is increas-
ingly important and necessary, so the courts should be allowed to let in as much 
of it as possible; after all, the courts—long stripped of layperson juries—have 
always been fully equipped to weigh the evidence appropriately, to ensure the 
justice of each case.
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